Abstract. Social contracts and norms can be defined as the selection of Nash-equilibrium in coordination game. However, existing studies on group coordination game are lack of a theoretical process which simulates the evolution of behaviors of agents, especially in a cycle network. In this paper, by means of establishing Cellular Automata Model (CAM) based on the Stag Hunt Game as the bottom model in cycle network, we simulate the dynamically evolutionary Group Stag-Hunt Game in which assumed that an individual has complete rationality. The conclusion suggested that the final results were related to the size of the payoff factor and the risk factor and the structure features of the network. This model provides dynamically evolutionary Group Stag Hunt Game researches in a cycle network with a theoretical support.
Introduction
Social contracts and norms have a great impact on individual behavior [1, 2] . Currently, social contracts and norms were increasingly described by Stag-Hunt game in experimental economics, which was an asymmetry game model concerned about the group coordination [3] .How it conducted individual choice has been studied abundantly. For instance, based on vast research data, Cooper found that it was easier to reach "coordination failure" so that the risk-dominant equilibrium was selected more in a repeated double Stag-Hunt game with numerous equilibrium [4] . Berninghaus suggested that a local reaction under various constructions of group double Stag-Hunt game would influence the eventual equilibrium in his paper [5] . An illustrative work by Camerer indicated that "coordination failure" would be certain to arise when the size of agents was out of range in a group coordination game regardless of whether external disturbance generated [6] .
Nowadays, most studies have focused on reaching Pareto Optimality in coordination game with a number of equilibrium. However, more and more findings showed that coordination game would fail without intervention. Many researchers attempted to account for this dilemma and came up with many hypotheses. In this article, two major hypotheses were emphasized. On the one hand, agents who participated in the game would be influenced by the differences between Pareto-dominated creieria and risk-dominated criteria [7] .Furthermore, it was confirmed in Carlsson and Mehta's Stag-Hunt game experiment that different criterions would receive totally different equilibrium circumstances [8, 9] . On the other hand, some social science scholars thought that the features of environment and construction of agents played an important role in the eventual equilibrium selections in an evolutionary perspective [7] . Such as Berninghaus demonstrated that local interactions had an effect on the result in weakest-link games [10] . What's more, Keser's comparative experiment between cyclic construction with mutual reactions and general weakest-link game in which three players chose two strategies suggested that a cyclic structure with mutual reactions would improve the Pareto Optimality [11] .
Although it has gotten various experiment conclusions, we lack a satisfied theoretical process which could perform the dynamical evolution of group game well. In consequence of the bounded rationality of agents [12] , it is necessary to build a theoretical model in which agents are completely rational to compare with the experimental results.
In this article, we build a group Stag-Hunt game model with a cyclic construction by Cellular Automation (CA)-which was came up with by John von Neumann in 19 th century and widely applied in various fields [13, 14] -to simulate behaviors of subjects who have complete rationality. According to the results of this simulation, we find that the final evolutionary state of the system is determined by the payment of different equilibrium and the number of subjects.
Modeling Approach
According to the characteristics of double Stag-Hunt game, we establish a new cellular automation approach based on the cyclic network to simulate the behaviors of subjects in a dynamically evolved way. The entire operations of the methodology are divided into following two sections. 1 Parameters defining Cell: Subjects who participate in the game. In this performance, we assume that everyone is completely rational and every cell's set of states-their optional choices in each round-consists of {1 0}, representing cooperation or not.
Cell space: The cyclic network formed by all subjects who take part in the game end to end. The feature of this network will be affected by the number of subjects. In this paper, both odd and even number situations will be discussed.
Neighborhood: Two other subjects who seat next to the cell. Their decisions made on the last round is the only factor that determines the selection of the cell in the present. 
Transition rules
In the CA framework, the state of each cell steps is based on a definite set of local transition rules. In this study, regardless of the influence which the cell brings to himself of his states, the current case only relies on the last decisions by neighbors. Coincidentally, this rule meets the requirements that one-dimensional and two-input Boolean Automaton needs.
The relationship between the size of a and 2b will get different rules. For example, in the condition of a<2b, the current state of the cell will be 1(cooperation) as long as one of his neighbors chose 1 in the last round. On the contrary, the state will be 0(refuse cooperation) when both neighbors chose 0 in the last round. At this time, the rule meets the requirements of 7 th Boolean Automaton, which represents the basic operation of OR in logical operations. But when a>2b, the results will be reversed and the rule will change into 1 th Boolean Automaton, which represents the basic operation of AND in logical operations. 
Process of Simulating
Due to the different features which cyclic network generates by odd and even subjects, we simulate the performance in each situation. 1 Odd cyclic network (e.g. 5 players)
In an odd cyclic network including five subjects, there are eight cases showing with figures in total.
Symbol represents state 1(cooperation) and represents 0(refuse cooperation) in figures. All the eight cases correspond respectively to: all 1, all 1 except one 0, three 1 which near continuously, three separated 1, two 1 which near continuously, two separated 1, only one 1 and no 1. In addition to these figures, we also need to determine the size of the relationship between a and 2b to decide which transition rule to use. We assume that one cell is regarded as a starting point and numbered first. And then, other cells will be numbered to fifth from the clockwise direction and the future will be determined by the state of neighbors. The following chart shows the results of different conditions. hence, if we number each initial network described above by eight figures, the next step of all states would be presented as follows. 2 Even cyclic network (e.g. 6 players) After discussion of the odd network, it's time to observe the network with an even subjects such as 6 subjects. There are thirteen cases showing with figures now. Likewise, symbol and symbol also represents 1 and 0. And then, all cases showing by figures are explained: all 1, all 1 except one 0, four 1 which near continuously, four separated 1 including two 1 which near continuously, four separated 1 including three 1 which near continuously, three 1 which near continuously, three separated 1 including two 1 which near continuously, three separated 1, two 1 which near continuously, two separated 1 without a common neighbor, two separated 1 with a common neighbor, only one 1 and no 1. We will discuss the both conditions like we did in odd network. We should acknowledge that the rest are as same as the odd network except the number of the states of network. So, we only pay attention to how all beginning network perform. Table 4 . Even network evolutionary step in different conditions.
Initial state figure number
Next step when a>2b Next step when a<2b  0  0  0  1  3  0  2  8  0  3  7  1  4  10  0  5  11  1  6  11  1  7  7  7  8  12  2  9  11  7  10  12  4  11  12  9  12 12 12
Results and Analysis

Odd cyclic network
In the odd cyclic network, the final results are as follows (↺ represents stable). We could see that the system eventually converged to all 1 and all 0. It can be observed that seven results of all 1 and only one result of all 0 compose the outcome when a>2b. Moreover, it will get an opposite outcome if a<2b. Table 5 . Odd network evolutionary process in different conditions.
Initial state figure number
Evolutionary result when a>2b Evolutionary result when a<2b  0  0↺  0↺  1  1→2→4→6→7↺  1→0↺  2  2→4→6→7↺  2→1→0↺  3  3→6→7↺  3→0↺  4  4→6→7↺  4→2→1→0↺  5  5→7↺  5→1→0↺  6  6→7↺  6→4→2→1→0↺  7 7↺ 7↺
All 1 and all 0 are the solutions to this question. However, further analysis should be taken into the consideration that whether the ending would transform if one cell is changed in some situation. A> 2b as example, solution will be converted into all 1 if we change the state of the cell which locates on all 0. Meanwhile, all 1 experiences clear difference form all 0 because it will maintain the original result even though we do the same. In this occasion, all 1 is the sole Nash-equilibrium which is stable. Correspondingly, all 0 will become the only stable solution in the condition of a<2b. One cell 0→1 0→1→2→4→6→7↺ 0→1→0↺ all 1(number 7)
One cell 1→0 7→6→7↺ 7→6→4→2→1→0↺
2 Even cyclic network In the same way, system will reach the case as follows in an even cyclic network. Unlike the odd cyclic network, it gets a periodic solution on the basis of the other two solutions. More interestingly, three periodic solutions exist permanently regardless of the relation between a and 2b in the even network with six subjects. Table 7 . Even network evolutionary process in different conditions.
Evolutionary result when a>2b Evolutionary result when a<2b 0 0↺ 0↺  1  1→3→7↺  1→0↺  2  2→8→12↺  2→0↺  3  3→7↺  3→1→0↺  4  4→10→12↺  4→0↺  5  5→11→12↺  5→1→0↺  6  6→11→12↺  6→1→0↺  7  7↺  7↺  8  8→12↺  8→2→0↺  9  9→11→12↺  9→7↺  10  10→12↺  10→4→0↺  11  11→12↺  11→9→7↺  12 12↺ 12↺
Continuously, we still concern about the stability of solutions. Same as the odd network, the stability of all 1 and all 0 rely on the size of a and 2b. Compared with those equilibrium, the stability of periodic solutions (half 1 and 0) is much more complex. In the condition of a>2b, for example, half 1 and 0 will get all 1 if we change the state of the cell from 0 to 1. However, the equilibrium will keep itself unexpectedly when we change the state of the cell from 1 to 0. 
Conclusion
After discussing and analyzing the procedure in which completely rational agents who participate in a Stag-Hunt game with a cyclic network develop the final equilibrium, we can conclude that: On the one hand, the stability of the solutions depends on the size of relationship between the payoff factor and the risk factor. When a>2b, the system will eventually evolve to a stable result in which all agents choose to cooperate and reach the Pareto dominated equilibrium. If a<2b, the ending will be opposite. Otherwise, there will be an extra one-side stable equilibrium which operates periodically rising up when the number of agents changes to even. In the condition of a>2b, this equilibrium will be down unilateral stable and it will be unilateral stable in the other circumstance.
On the other hand, the evolution of the system is related to the number of agents in the network. Pareto dominated equilibrium and risk dominated equilibrium will arise in an odd cyclic network. A transform from odd to even will bring an extra one-side stable equilibrium which works periodically every time. Although it's stable in macro, the fluctuation of cells in the micro determines its instability.
These findings provide a theoretical support for future study about dynamic evolution of multiplayer Stag-Hunt game in a cyclic network.
